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• An autonomous system should act ethically, but what if it has no all-ethical choice?
• Wemodel how to rank states violating multiple instances of ethical principles.
• We enable an autonomous system to use this ethic rank to rank its available plans.
• We guarantee that when a plan is chosen, it is the most ethical plan available.
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a b s t r a c t
Autonomous systems such as unmanned vehicles are beginning to operate within society. All participants
in society are required to follow specific regulations and laws. An autonomous system cannot be an
exception. Inevitably an autonomous system will find itself in a situation in which it needs to not only
choose to obey a rule or not, but also make a complex ethical decision. However, there exists no obvious
way to implement the human understanding of ethical behaviour in computers. Even if we enable
autonomous systems to distinguish between more and less ethical alternatives, how can we be sure
that they would choose right? We consider autonomous systems with a hybrid architecture in which the
highest level of reasoning is executed by a rational (BDI) agent. For such a system, formal verification has
been used successfully to prove that specific rules of behaviour are observed when making decisions. We
propose a theoretical framework for ethical plan selection that can be formally verified. We implement a
rational agent that incorporates a given ethical policy in its plan selection and show that we can formally
verify that the agent chooses to execute, to the best of its beliefs, the most ethical available plan.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Autonomous systems are increasingly required in various
practical applications, including unmanned aircraft, driver-less
cars, healthcare robots, manufacturing robots, etc. In all of these
cases it is easy to imagine a situationwhere an autonomous system
causes harm to people or property, as a result of an error in
its engineering, or an unfortunate combination of circumstances.
Therefore, if such autonomous systems are to operate within
society,wemust be able to trust that their behaviour complieswith
the legal, social, and ethical norms of that society. Determining the
trustworthiness of technology in this respect is usually delegated
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(for aircraft in the USA) or the Vehicle Certification Authority (for
road vehicles in the UK). The process is known as certification, and
is used to determine the safety and reliability of safety-critical
technology, including aircraft, road vehicles, nuclear reactors,
pharmaceuticals, etc.
For non-autonomous systems, such as cars or manned aircraft,
it is assumed that the operator of the system will satisfy the
ethical standards of society, e.g., the pilot of a civilian aircraft
does not intend to use the aircraft to commit murder, and will,
if necessary, disregard legal restrictions for ethical reasons, e.g.,
the pilot will disregard the Rules of the Air in order to preserve
human life. These assumptions are an unavoidable result of the
opacity of human behaviour; it is extremely difficult to pre-
determine the behaviour of a human being. However, autonomous
systems are far more transparent, and can be engineered to meet
requirements. Typically these requirements are technical (‘‘an
aircraft must be able to fly at 10,000 feet’’) or legal (‘‘a car must
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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systems some requirements may be ethical (e.g., ‘‘an autonomous
unmanned aircraft will never choose to do something dangerous
unless it has no other option’’). Such ethical requirements may
prove essential for an autonomous system to be certified by a
regulatory body, since ethical autonomy is obviously desirable.
Machine ethics is an emerging discipline concerned with
ensuring that the behaviour of machines towards humans and
other machines they interact with is ethical [1]. It is an open
question whether machines are, or will ever be, moral agents, i.e.,
in possession of an innate ability to distinguish between right or
wrong. However, it is necessary to enable them to adhere to our
human understanding of morality, despite there exists no obvious
or easy way to accomplish this [2–5].
If we assume that an autonomous system can be capable of
moral agency, and possibly even be a better moral agent than a
person, the goal of machine ethics is to enable machines to reason
ethically. Notable works in this area are [6–11]. Within this sub-
area of machine ethics a lot of the questions traditionally studied
in moral philosophy are reiterated but now from a computational
perspective. The focus of research lies on automated extraction
and identification of ethical guidelines for conduct, as well as
on automated solving of ethical ambiguities and problems. These
systems are often developed with the intention to be used to aid
ethical decision-making by people.
If we assume that an autonomous system is not capable of
moral agency, then the goal of machine ethics is to ensure that
machines behave ethically. This is done by developing methods for
ethically constraining the actions of machines [12]. Within this
subarea of machine ethics, research focuses on identifying ethical
principles that a system should not violate during its operation
and developing methods for embedding consideration of these
ethical principles in the decision-making process of the machine.
Examples of work in this area are [13–15].
We are interested in representing and embedding considera-
tion for ethical principles in the decision-making process of an au-
tonomous system in a way that is amenable to certification. The
work on ethically constraining actions of autonomous machines
in [13–15] focuses on machines used in military operations and
methods for stopping the autonomous machine from performing
any action that is deemed unethical, but it does not consider cir-
cumstances where no ethical action is possible. Our focus in this
paper is on civil applications. We propose a method for selecting
among unethical actions, when no ethical action is possible, and
for proving that a machine only behaves unethically, by choosing
a minimally unethical course of action, if it has no ethical choice.
1.1. Formal verification
It appears increasingly the case, particularly in autonomous
vehicles, that the autonomous control architecture is of hybrid
form comprising discrete and continuous parts. Traditionally such
systems have been engineered using the concept of a hybrid
automaton (in which continuous aspects are encapsulatedwithin a
single state of an automaton while discrete jumps are represented
as transitions between these states). However, as these systems
have become more complex, combining discrete decision-making
and continuous control in this way has created challenges for
understandability and reuse of design and code.
Since we are particularly interested in the issue of decision-
making, rather than control we have focused here on an
alternative architecture, referred to as a hybrid agent architecture
in which a distinguished agent is responsible for decision-
making. This is motivated by evidence that hybrid automata based
implementations scale poorly with the complexity of decision-
making when compared to agent-based control [16,17]. A typicalsuch architecture is shown in Fig. 1. The discrete part is often
represented by a rational agent taking the high-level decisions,
providing explanations of its choices, and invoking lower-level
continuous procedures [18]. In this kind of hybrid autonomous
system the continuous control and the higher-order decision-
making components can be separated clearly. The lower-level
procedures appear in non-autonomous systems as well, and are
familiar to certification authorities. As such, we can focus analysis
on the decisions the rational agent makes, given the beliefs and
goals it has [19].
In an autonomous systemwe cannot show that an agent always
does the right thing, but only that its actions are taken for the right
reasons. Following this premise, formal verification, more precisely
model checking, has been used in [20] for providing formal evi-
dence for the certification of autonomous unmanned aircraft. For-
mal verification [21] involves proving or disproving that a system
is compliant with a ‘‘formally specified property’’: a requirement
specified in a mathematical language. Formal verification is an ap-
plication of FormalMethods to the challenge of systemverification.
Model checking is a variety of formal verification in which all pos-
sible executions of a system are examined automatically based on
a model of the real world. Model checking takes place relative to
some requirement specified in a formal language [22].
In [19,20] formal verification is used to assess whether or not
an autonomous system for an unmanned aircraft (UA) follows the
specified ‘‘Rules of the Air’’ (ROA) that a pilot should follow [23].
The stated aim in these papers is to provide evidence that the
autonomous system in control of an unmanned aircraft is safe and
reliable, therefore providing supporting evidence for the potential
certification of such an aircraft. The rationale behind using the
Rules of the Air is that they provide a codified, statutory set
of behaviours which human (and machine) pilots should satisfy.
However, there are many circumstances that are not covered
by the Rules of the Air. Indeed, the Rules of the Air are not
intended to be exhaustive, but rather to provide a set of guidelines
for pilot behaviour. It is anticipated that the Rules of the Air
will be implemented by a skilled and experienced pilot whose
responsibility is to ensure the safe passage of the aircraft through
airspace (in this case, civil airspace). In those circumstances which
are not covered by explicit Rules of the Air, it is the responsibility
of the autonomous system in control of an unmanned aircraft to
make sensible, rational, safe and ethical decisions at all times. So,
while the formal verification of safe and legal decision-making
has been covered in previous papers, we now focus on the
formal verification of ethical decision-making within autonomous
systems controlling autonomous aircraft.
1.2. Overview
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2we cover relevant
background material on autonomous systems, machine ethics
and verification. In Section 3 we outline our formal theoretical
framework for the implementation and verification of ethically
constrained behaviour in autonomous systems and also point to
some relationships of our framework to deontic logic. In Section 4
we discuss our prototype implementation of this framework. In
Section 5 we consider three simple examples of ethical reasoning
implemented in our prototype, while, in Section 6, we present our
conclusions and discuss further work.
2. Background
2.1. Agent architectures for autonomous systems
Webster et al. [19] discuss the analysis of an autonomous un-
manned aircraft controller as a hybrid system, with an architec-
ture such as the one given in Fig. 1. The rational agent-based
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arated from lower level control systems (such as the autopilot).
This enables the decision space of the agent to be analysed sepa-
rately from the lower level control systems.Model checking (which
is best applied to discrete problems) is then used to analyse the
high level decision-making and methods, such as testing (or in-
deed theorem proving—see [24] for an example of where program
model checking of an agent is combined with a theorem proving
approach based on hybrid automata), are used to verify1 the be-
haviour of the lower level control systems. These two approaches
can be used together to provide a higher level of assurance that the
systemwould behave as expected than either can provide individ-
ually. For example, it is possible to verify that an agent in control
of an unmanned aircraft will always attempt an emergency land-
ing if it runs out of fuel. Then the lower-level control systems can
be analysed separately to ensure that, once this decision has been
taken by the agent, the auto-land systemswill correctly implement
the emergency landing.
The predominant view of rational agency is that encapsulated
within the BDI model [25]. ‘‘BDI’’ stands for Beliefs, Desires, and
Intentions: beliefs represent the agent’s (possibly incomplete,
possibly incorrect) information about itself, other agents, and its
environment; desires represent the agent’s long-term aims; while
intentions represent the aims that the agent is actively pursuing.
There aremany different agent programming languages and agent
platforms based, at least in part, on the BDI approach. An overview
of particular languages for programming rational agents in a BDI-
like way can be found in [26]. Agents programmed in these
languages commonly contain a set of beliefs, a set of goals (i.e.,
desires), and a set of plans. Plans determine how an agent acts
based on its beliefs and goals. As a result of executing a plan, the
beliefs and goals of an agent may change as the agent performs
actions in its environment. It is important to note that, in a typical
BDI programming language, plans are supplied by a programmer
not by an independent planning mechanism.
2.2. Model checking
While the conventional hardware and software used within
an autonomous machine can be certified as any complex tool,
the decision-making component of an agent-based autonomous
machine needs to be certified in a way that has more in common
with the way persons in a position of responsibility are certified.
The manufacturer needs to offer evidence that the machine will
make decisions for the right reasons. To accomplish this, we
can use formal verification [21,24]. Formal verification involves
proving or disproving that a system is compliant with a ‘‘formally
specified property’’: a requirement specified in a mathematical
language. Formal verification is an application of Formal Methods
to the challenge of system verification. Model checking is a variety
of formal verification in which all possible executions of a system
can be examined automatically based on amodel of the real world.
1 Here we use this word in the traditional sense rather than in the ‘‘formal
verification’’ sense; see later.Model checking takes place relative to some requirement specified
in a formal language [22]. Typically, the formal requirement, or
property, is expressed within a linear temporal logic which allows
us to specify what should happen at some specific moment, at
somepoint in the future, or at all points in the future (or somemore
complex combination of these).
Computer programs for autonomous systems are typically
deterministic in nature, but when placed within the real world
the behaviour of deterministic systems becomes unpredictable as
the real-world is non-deterministic. In other words, a variety of
things can happen to the system at any given time. Therefore
there is a range of possible things that a system can do within a
given environment. This can be handled within model-checking
by analysing the environment to determine the finite set of input
classes that effect the agents’ decision-making. This approach is
described in [21,24]. We adapt this approach when we perform
verification in our case studies in Section 5 by exploring different
ways the possible ethical consequences of an agent’s choices can
be represented.
It should be noted that an important alternative approach to
the verification of hybrid systems is that of hybrid model checking
[27,28] in which the system is designed and/or implemented as a
hybrid automaton and well-developed techniques are then used
to model check that automaton. There is also a theorem proving
approach to the verification of hybrid automata [29]. As discussed
above, hybrid automata are not ideal when complex decision-
making is involved andwe consider ethical choice to be an example
of complex decision-making. It is certainly not ideal if we wish to
verify the ethical sub-component of some system, separately to the
verification of the system as a whole which, as in our case, may
involve planning or learning sub-systems which operate as ‘‘black
boxes’’ and have not been verified.
Model checking has been used in [20] for providing formal
evidence for the certification of autonomous unmanned aircraft.
Specifically, an autonomous system for an unmanned aircraft
(consisting of a rational agent) was developed and formally verified
using Agent Java PathFinder, a programmodel checker for rational
agents [30]. The properties verified were based on the ‘‘Rules
of the Air’’ (ROA) and notions of Airmanship. The latter refer to
requirements which do not necessarily appear in the Rules of the
Air (which is a statutory document), but nevertheless constitute
good practice for ‘‘airmen’’. Clearly Airmanship can apply to an
autonomous system in control of an aircraft as well as to a pilot.
For example, it was verified that in all cases the rational agent in
control of the unmanned aircraft would request clearance before
taxiing onto themanoeuvring area of an aerodrome (a specific Rule
of the Air), and that in all cases the agent would check its current
fuel level before take off (Airmanship), amongst other things. We
use this work as the basis for our case studies in Section 5.
3. A framework for constraining ethical behaviour and its
formal verification
Our concern in this paper is with high-level decision-making in
autonomous systems that not only takes ethics into account when
reasoning but which also can be proved to do so. This gives us three
tasks to resolve:
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making to be ethically constrained,
2. Demonstrate how such a formalism can be implemented,
3. Provide a logical specification against which an implemented
system that claims to make ethically constrained decisions can
be checked.
In order to show that an autonomous system has the property of
making the right decisions for the right reasons, we need to first
define and formally specify what the ‘‘right decisions’’ are, not only
in the operational, but also in the moral sense of the word. In this
paper we mainly focus on this problem of formal specification of
moral machine decisions for the purpose of verification.
3.1. Professional ethics for agents
Ethics is a sub-field of philosophy that studies moral values and
moral reasoning. Normative theories of ethics are concerned with
designing ethical principles that constrain the behaviour of people
within ethically desirable boundaries. An overview of the most
popular normative theories can be found in [11]. Ethical principles
are rules of conduct that should guide the behaviour of moral
agentswhenmakingdecisions. Typically they are formalor abstract
by design allowing for applicability in a wide range of specific
situations that arise. These formal principles are intended to be
additionally made concrete, or substantive, constraints by applying
the facts of the decision-making context. For example, the formal
principle of doing no harm is violated by a specific action ofmoving
ten metres to the left when an aircraft is on the ground, therefore
the aircraft should be ethically constrained from performing this
action in this circumstance. The same action should not be ethically
constrained when the aircraft is airborne.
How abstract principles are transformed into substantive rules
that constrain behaviour is a difficult problem, even for people. An
abstract ethical principle can be specified by narrowing the scope
in which it should be applied, namely by specifying ‘‘what, where,
why, how, by what means, by whom, or to whom an action is to
be, is not to be, or may be done’’ (p. 295, [31]). Within machine
ethics, a growing body of research has been devoted to making
these transformations, e.g., [10,8].
We are interested in using ethical principles to constrain the
behaviour of an agent, therefore we must answer two questions:
where do we get these ethical principles and how dowe transform
them into precise context-dependent constraints?
Autonomous systems, and robots in particular, are being
developed as specialised assistants and tools with a pre-designed
domain of application. We suggest, therefore, that we should
think of autonomous systems as members of a profession and
use this insight when developing ethically behaving machines. For
example, medical robots can be seen as members of the medical
profession, while autonomous systems for unmanned aircraft can
be seen as aircrew personnel. If machines are seen as special
members of a profession, then special ethics that apply solely to
machines is not necessary. We can focus not on developing ethical
principles but on ensuring that an autonomous system’s high-level
decision-making is subject to a code of ethics that has already been
decided upon by relevant authorities and associations.
We make some assumptions regarding the availability of
abstract ethical principles and rules. We assume that each
professional domain has abstract ethical principles developed,
which express what is considered right and wrong within that
domain. For example, in the biomedical domain, the principles
of respect of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice,
as summarised on (pp. 13–14 [32]) are considered to be the core
abstract ethical principles.
Given a set of formal principles, we still need the substantive
principles to actually evaluate how ethical an intended conduct is.For frequently occurring situations, the relevant institutions and
governing bodies can, and do, instantiate the abstract principles
into substantive rules. For example, each country or biomedical
institution would further instantiate the mentioned abstract
ethical principles into rules that should be followed under given
conditions. Thus, for instance, the abstract principle of respect for
autonomy is instantiated into a rule that precisely describes when
a patient’s desire to refuse treatment must be observed by not
forcing treatment.
We distinguish between anticipated contexts, for which sub-
stantive principles can be determined directly and unanticipated
contexts. For anticipated contexts, we can reasonably assume that
substantive principles will also be defined. Since machine ethical
reasoning is outside of the scope of our work, for unanticipated
contexts we shall assume that the agent is additionally informed,
by a human attendant or by the context itself, of what constitutes
a breach of an abstract principle in that context.
Having established where the ethical principles for an au-
tonomous agent come from, we now elaborate on how we intend
to ethically constrain the reasoning process of an agent using these
principles.
Arkin et al. [13,14] propose an addition to the reasoning process,
a so called ethical governor, effectively embeddedwithin the agent.
The ethical governor evaluates each plan with respect to given
ethical constraints and removes those plans that violate at least
one of the constraints.
However, in civilian operations, stopping all actions that violate
at least one ethical principle is not always a satisfactory method
of ensuring ethical behaviour. Assume that an agent is choosing
which plan to execute and the ethical governor vetoes all available
plans as unethical. Should the agent just wait for the world to
change?What if taking no action is also unethical? Situations such
as these, in which each course of action leads to violating one or
more ethical principles, are called ‘‘ethical dilemmas’’. In an ethical
dilemma a person that behaves ethically would still be considered
to behave ethically when she violates the lightest of the ethical
principles that she could under the circumstances. It is not difficult
to illustrate this point with an example from medicine.
A core principle in medical ethics is that of not doing harm. A
substantive rule that ensues is to distinguish, during childbirth,
between the life of an unborn child and that of its mother, i.e.,
both need to be preserved. However, circumstances arise in which
preserving both lives is not possible and the principle of doing no
harm must be violated at least once by making a choice of whose
life to save. If a choice is not made the principle of doing no harm
would be violated twice. Which life to save is no longer an issue
of medical ethics but an issue of private moral choice made by
the mother or her next of kin. Arguments can be found to justify
either choosing to save the mother or the baby, and some mothers
would choose differently to others. However, neither choice can be
considered universallymoral or immoral. On the other hand, doing
nothing, letting bothmother and child die ismorally reprehensible.
We want an autonomous system to be capable of minimising
the unethical outcomes under the circumstances where there is
no ethical option available. To accomplish this we need to enable
the autonomous system to distinguish the available choices in
terms of how badly they violate ethical principles and choose
the ‘‘least unethical’’ one. Now the question we need to resolve
is: how can we constrain the unethical actions of autonomous
systemsbut allow them tomake justifiably unethical choices under
certain circumstances? We propose that instead of treating the
ethical principles as a veto on actions, we view them instead
as soft constraints. With ethical principles as soft constraints
an autonomous system would be allowed to violate an ethical
principle, but only under the condition that there is no ethical
option available and under the assurance that the unethical option
chosen is the ‘‘least of all evils’’.
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need an ethical policy. An ethical policy is an order over the rules
that are applicable in the same situation, in terms of which rule it
is better to violate when no ethical option is possible.
The principles and rules are obtained from the ethical code of
conduct within a given society, but where does the policy come
from? Some professional codes of conduct do offer guidance as
to the priority among principles in the case of conflict. When
such guidance is unavailable or inapplicable, people are expected
to follow their own moral judgments. Assuming that machines,
certainly as is the case at present, are devoid of a moral judgment
capability, we advance that the person who is the most influenced
by the immediate consequences of the machines decision-making
should be the source of the ethical policy.
To justify our stance we return to the example of mother and
child in danger during delivery.When the decision is needed about
whether the life of the mother or the life of the unborn infant
should be given precedence, the decision-maker makes an ethical
preference and that decision maker is the person with decision-
making capacity that is most influenced by the choice, i.e., the
mother (the infant is not in capacity) or if the mother is not in
capacity, her next of kin. It is advantageous thatmost legal systems
often clearly define both the decision-making capacity property
and the next of kin relation between persons. An autonomous
systemmaking ethical decisions should thus be equipped with the
policy of the person or persons who would be most afflicted if a
bad decision is made by the system.
Within our framework we cannot express how gravely an
ethical principle is violated. For example making a scratch on
another UA counts as damaging property to the same extent
as obliterating that UA is damaging property. However, a plan
that incorporates two actions each of which violating a principle
separately is considered less ethical than a plan that has only one
action that violates the same principle (assuming this second plan
does not violate some other, lower ranked principle as well).
3.2. Ethical plans and planning
To construct an ethical reasoning process formachines we need
to represent abstract ethical principles and specific ethical rules,
paired with the context in which they apply and then invoke these
at an appropriate moment in an agent’s reasoning process.
As noted in Section 2.1, the reasoning of a rational agent is
controlled by its beliefs, its goals and its plans. The plans are
presumed to have been supplied by a programmer. Therefore, on
a trivial level, the task of ensuring that the agent acts in an ethical
fashion, should lie with the programmer who should ensure that
the plans are ethical. Given our assumption of a pre-existing set
of ethical rules, showing that such plans always preserve the rules
can then be tackled using pre-existing verification approaches.
However, in many realistic scenarios, it is either not possible
to provide an exhaustive set of plans that will cover all situations
or, at least, not possible to provide such plans in full detail. So, for
instance, a plan may need additional complex information such
as the calculation of a route or schedule that is based on the
situation inwhich it finds itself. For simplicitywewill treat all such
situations as the acquisition of entirely new plans.
There are long traditions of AI research into specialised
route planners and schedulers as well as more general plan
generation systems such as [33–35], and such planners are good
candidates for integration with BDI-style languages; indeed many
BDI researchers are interested in such integrations.
In our case we were particularly interested in a route planner
such as that implemented in [36] which can generate different
routes for a UA to follow. The construction of an appropriate
planner is not the focus of this work, which looks at how a typicalBDI agent would work with the output of such a planner. We do
assume that such a planner can inform an agent about the relevant
side effects of any plan generated—in our cases the nature of
anything with which the UA might collide. We do not discuss here
how some system reasons to determine the side effects of such
a plan, obvious candidates include simulations (e.g., as discussed
in [37]) or specialised algorithms for, for instance, reasoning about
collision avoidance (indeed a verified version of such an algorithm
exists [38]). See also [3].
We assume therefore that there are two modes of operation
for our rational agent. In one mode the agent uses its pre-existing
(potentially pre-verified) set of plans in situationswhich arewithin
its anticipated parameters. In these cases it is assumed that the
programmer has taken responsibility for any ethical issues that
may arise. In the other mode of operation the rational agent is
working outside of these parameters but has various planning
resources available to it which allow it to continue to act. In this
situation it must use ethical reasoning to govern its actions.
Thus a software agent needs to apply ethical reasoning when
new options become available. New options are needed when:
1. no plan is available, or,
2. a plan is available, and has been attempted, but does not appear
to be working.
We assume that the agent has access to some external planning
mechanism from which it can obtain new plans. The new plans
supplied by the external planner can then be associated with
substantive ethical rules, i.e., the sets of ethical principles which
are violated by that plan (thiswork of association can be performed
either by the agent, the planner or some other system). The job of
the agent, then, is to determinewhich of the available plans are the
most ethical to follow.
Let us begin by defining an abstract ethical principle and an
ethical policy.
Definition 1 (Abstract Ethical Principle). An abstract ethical prin-
ciple is represented with Eϕ, where ϕ is a propositional logic
formula. The Eϕ is read as ‘‘ϕ is an ethical principle in force’’, or al-
ternatively ‘‘the agent considers it unethical to allow or cause ¬ϕ
(to happen)’’.
Definition 2 (Ethical Policy). An ethical policy Pol is a tuple Pol =
⟨E, ⟩ where E is a finite set of abstract ethical principles Eϕ, and
is a total (not necessarily strict) order on E. The expression
Eϕ1 = Eϕ2 denotes that violating ϕ1 is as unethical as violating
ϕ2, while Eϕ1 Eϕ2 denotes that violating ϕ1 is equally or less
unethical to violating ϕ2. A special type of ethical principle,
denoted Eϕ∅, is vacuously satisfied and included in every policy
so that for every Eϕ ∈ E: Eϕ∅ m Eϕ, denoting it is always strictly
more unethical to allow any of the unethical situations to occur.
We now need to represent the ethical rules which are a
specification of an abstract ethical principle by a context. Anderson
and Anderson [6] show how cased-based reasoning and abduction
can be used to identify ethical rules. This approach not only
instantiates an ethical principle into a context dependent rule,
but also resolves conflicts among rules by specification. (See, for
example, [39] for an overview of conflict resolution approaches.)
We propose that this process of specification, or instantiation,2 is
externalised altogether.
2 Note that the term ‘‘specification’’ as used in the conflict resolution literature
means that something is made more specific, e.g., [39]. It should not be confused
with ‘‘specification’’ which we use in e.g.,‘‘specification languages’’ where the term
denotes representation. The more appropriate term, in our opinion, for making
something more specific in a computer science context is ‘‘instantiation’’ and this
is the term we use in the remainder of this article.
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example, an institution, a state, or a company, it is not unusual
to expect that the context informs the agent of what counts
as a violation of the laws and principles by which the context
is governed. Within normative reasoning these are encoded as
statements of the form ‘‘X counts as Y in context C’’ [40,41].
The counts-as statements and their generation can be seen as a
mechanism for implementing context instantiation, such as the
one we need to transform abstract ethical principles into rules.
In general, an agent’s context can be identified by space, time,
goals, and/or a variety of other factors. However, an agent can be
constructed to manage a context regardless of how abstract it is.
We start with the assumption that an agent’s environment is
‘‘intelligent’’. Instead of considering the contexts to be a passive
collection of properties, we consider them to be an agent extended
to facilitate structures as described in [42]. The agent of [42] is
extended with two sets: Content and Context, describing the
sets of agents it contains, and is containedwithin, respectively. This
agent can implement the approach of [6] to derive the rules that
should be observed by the agent it contains.
We can now define ethical rules to be context-dependent
statements pairing actions with ethical principles.
Definition 3 (Ethical Rules). Given a context c , an action a and an
ethical principle Eϕ , an ethical rule is the formula
do(a)⇒c ¬Eϕ (1)
denoting that ‘‘doing action a in context c counts as a violation of
ethical principle ϕ’’.
For simplicity we can consider that do(¬a) represents not doing
an action. This formalisation is needed to represent cases when
abstaining from action is an ethical infringement, for example not
calling an ambulance when witnessing a person having a heart
attack.
To be able to reason about plans in terms of ethics we need a
plan selection procedure that uses the substantive policy implied
by the abstract policy. We favour plans that violate the fewest
concerns, both in number and in gravity.We propose that the plans
are ordered using < which results in a total order over plans. The
agent can be inmultiple contexts while determining which plan to
choose, so we need to consider the rules from all the contexts that
apply to the plan.
Definition 4 (Ethical Plan Order). Given a policy Pol = ⟨E, ⟩, and
a plan p, a violation collection for p, Vp, is a multiset (one principle
can appearmultiple times) of abstract ethical principles defined as:
Vp = ⟨Eϕ | Eϕ ∈ E, a ∈ p, do(a)⇒c ¬Eϕ⟩. (2)
For ethical plans, Vp = ∅. We define the operation worst3 as
follows:
worst(Vp) = {Eϕ | Eϕ ∈ Vp and ∀Eϕ′ ∈ Vp : Eϕ′ Eϕ}. (3)
Consider a set of available, possibly ethical, plans, P = {p1, . . . , pn}.
An ethical plan order < is a reflexive and antisymmetric relation <
over P that satisfies the following properties. For every pi, pj ∈ P ,
it holds that pi ≻ pj if at least one of the following holds:
1. Vpi = ∅ and Vpj ≠ ∅.
2. Eϕ Eϕ′ for every Eϕ ∈ worst(Vpi \ Vpj) and every Eϕ′ ∈
worst(Vpj \ Vpi).
3. Eϕ = Eϕ′ for every Eϕ ∈ worst(Vpi \ Vpj), and every Eϕ′ ∈
worst(Vpj \ Vpi), while |worst(Vpi \ Vpj)| < |worst(Vpj \ Vpi)|.
3 Note that worst is a set since is not a strict order. However all the ethical
principles, φ, appearing in worst(Vp)will be equal wrt. .If none of (1), (2), or (3) holds, then pi and pj are equally (un)ethical,
i.e., pi ∼ pj.
The first property above ensures that the ethical plans will always
be preferred to the unethical ones. The second property states that
when the principles violated by both plans are disregarded, the
plan that violates theworst principle is considered less ethical. The
third property guarantees thatwhen theworst principles that each
plan violate are different, but equally bad, the plan which violates
more such principles is less ethical.
Reasoning about plans and preference-based planning has been
considered before in the BDI agent literature. However, to the
best of our knowledge, preference-based planning has not been
applied to ethical reasoning. For example, in [43] plan selection is
considered in terms of agents’ desires. However, the desires are not
ranked, so selecting the most desirable plan is done by summing
up the number of desires each plan satisfies. In [44] the agent
can reason about plans by selecting the plan that can satisfy the
most goals. Goals are ranked and the plan selection functionsmuch
as our plan ordering above. For an overview of preference-based
planning in BDI agents one can consider [45].
Similarly, planning with priorities is considered in the lit-
erature. The difference between planning with priorities and
preference-based planing is that in the first case one considers
how a planner might choose which plan to develop given a rank-
ing on the goals the agent wants to achieve, while in the second
case the ranking is on the plans themselves. In [46], a planner is
proposed that develops those plans which would accomplish the
highest ranked goals of the agent. Only after attempting to find a
plan for the most preferred goals, the planner would attempt to
construct a plan for reaching a less desirable goal. In [47], the issue
of deadlines is considered in combination with the desirability of
goals. The main idea is that an agent would only be interested in
pursuing a goal if it can be feasibly reached within a certain dead-
line. Thus the plan selection and generation is influenced by the
deadline by which the goal should be reached, not only by the de-
sirability of the goal itself.
Preference-based planning, as well as planing with priorities
and planing in general is outside of the scope of this work. For
now the above-described plan order is sufficient for plan selection.
Inevitably, in real-world implementations, the question of critical
deadlines can be expected to rise. Namely, the most ethical
decision is not always the least unethical decision that can bemade
under the circumstances, but the least unethical course of action
that can be feasibly accomplished under a deadline. The impact of
deadlines on the ethical policy, as well context-dependent policy
updating in general, is an issue we intend to explore in our future
work.
3.3. Eϕ and deontic logic
Deontic logic is the sub-field of logic and reasoning most
concerned with representing and reasoning about obligations.
Counts-as-statements, the paradigm of which we use to represent
our ethical rules, and reasoningwith themare considered to belong
to the field of deontological reasoning [40].
Since we build an ethical reasoning method on abstract ethical
principles and ethical rules, the natural question to ask is why
introduce a new representation Eϕ instead of relying on a
formalisation developed in deontic logic, even more so since the
abstract ethical principles have already been linked to prima facie
obligations. However, deontic logics, in particular the standard
deontic logic, are notoriously inadequate for specifying prima facie
duties, as illustratedwith numerous paradoxes [48]. For this reason
we choose to introduce the construct E to denote ethical principles,
instead of using the deontological obligation operator O.
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sible’’ ethical principles and a very similar concept developed in
deontic logic, that of contrary-to-duty (CTD) imperatives [49]. CTD
imperatives are ordered conditional pairs or lists of obligations, for
example α1 > α2 > α3 represents that the agent is obliged to (do)
α1, but if the agent violates α1, or for whatever reason ¬α1 is the
case, then the agent is obliged to (do) α2 and if α2 is not observed
then the agent is obliged to (do) α3. SimilarlyO(α1 | α2) represents
that under the condition α1, α2 is an obligation.
The difference between a CTD imperative and Eϕ is that all
ethical principles are in force at the same time, while a CTD
imperative is in force only if a higher ranked one has failed. The
CTD imperatives do not indicate how to choose between α1 and
α2, but rather generate a new principle when the existing principle
is failed, they act as a form of cascading ‘‘damage containment’’.
An ethical policy differs in this manner from CTD imperatives, as
it orders ethical principles in terms of importance but all ethical
principles are in force at all times. Thus a policy ϕ1 ≻ ϕ2 ≻ ϕ3,
denotes ‘‘priority’’, namely ideally all ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 are in force, but
if one has to be violated, it is better to violate ϕ1 before violating
either ϕ2 or ϕ3.
With CTD imperatives, the ranking is no indication of priority,
but it implies that if α1 > α2 > α3 activation of α3 implies
violation ofα2 andα1.With ethical principles, a violation of a lower
ranked principle according to does not imply a violation of the
higher ranked, ethically better principles. For example, consider
the principle to not violate people’s privacy Eϕ1, which is breached
for instance when making low flights over private property, and
the principle to do no harm Eϕ2. Our UA can violate ϕ2 by crashing
atop a person on an open road without violating anyone’s privacy.
Within the study of CTD imperatives, there are works consid-
ering how to extend an ordering over imperatives into an order-
ing over sets of imperatives, which identify states of the world and
could be taken to correspond to our plans [50], however the order-
ing of the sets hinges upon the inherent properties of the ranking
of CTD imperatives.
We have constructed the structure Eϕ deliberately to have E
allude to a modal logic box (necessitation) operator, but we have
given no specific syntax for this operator. Furthermore, there exists
a precise semantical and syntactical formalisation of a counts-as
operator as amodal logic operator in [40], butwehave not included
the semantics here. The precise semantics of an E modal operator
captures the whole meaning of an abstract ethical principle is
worthy object of study on its own, but outside of the scope of our
interests at present work. We are here interested in constructing
an agent programming language and the logic we use is primarily
for specification purposes.
3.4. Verifying decision-making is ethical
We can now begin to define a logical property which specifies
what it means for an implemented agent to reason ethically.
Informally we mean that whenever an agent selects a plan, p, then
all other applicable plans, p′, are ethically worse, i.e., that p < p′.
We could frame this in linear temporal logic (where ‘’ means ‘‘at
all future moments’’) as
 (∀p.selected(p)→ ∀p′.(applicable(p′)→ (p ≻ p′))). (4)
Unfortunately this property is first order involving quantification
over planswhich are unknownwhen the verification process starts
since they are calculated during the course of execution. In general
model checking systems cannot handle this kind of quantification.
Insofar as quantification can appear at all in properties it should
ideally be a shorthand for enumeration over a finite set whose
members are known before model checking starts. In our case, the
ethical policy forms such a set where the possible plans do not.Fortunately it is comparatively straightforward to relate the plans
and the ethical principles.
We will use Vφ to indicate that ethical rule φ is violated by
the currently selected plan. This can be checked as model checking
proceeds, when plans are known, but the particular plan referred
to does not need to be stated at the outset of checking.
We will also need to refer to the set of ethical principles,W (φ),
that aremore important than some principle φ—i.e., it is preferable
to violate φ than the principles inW (φ).
W (φ) ≡ {φ′ | Eφ′ Eφ}.
WeuseNPΦ to indicate that there is no applicable but unselected
plan that does not violate some principle in the setΦ . As with Vφ
this property can be checked as model checking proceeds, but can
also be stated before model checking starts.
We can then formulate our general property as
∀φ. (Vφ → NPW (φ)). (5)
This can be instantiated for particular agent instances by enumer-
ating the ethical concerns φ and the setW (φ). We provide exam-
ples of such instantiations in Section 5.
4. Implementation
We developed a BDI agent language called Ethan for a
prototype implementation of our approach. Ethan was based on
the Gwendolen agent programming language. A full operational
semantics for Gwendolen is presented in [51], but its key
components are, for each agent, a set, Σ , of beliefs which are
ground first order formulae and a set, I , of intentions that are
stacks of deeds associated with some event. Deeds can be the
addition or deletion of beliefs, the adoption of new goals, and
the execution of primitive actions. A Gwendolen agent may have
several concurrent intentions and will, by default, execute the first
deed on each intention stack in turn. Gwendolen is event-driven
and events include the acquisition of new beliefs (typically via
perception),messages and goals. A programmer supplies plans that
describe how an agent should react to events by extending the
deed stack of the relevant intention.
4.1. Implementation of ethical reasoning
In our prototype, ethical reasoning was integrated into a
BDI agent programming language via the agents’ plan selection
mechanism. In accordance with our theory, we assumed that the
agent’s existing plans are ethical by default and, indeed, had been
formally verified as such. In the scenarios we consider below we
assume the verification of the formal ‘‘Rules of the Air’’ and notions
of Airmanship as discussed in [19] satisfied this requirement.
Obviously we were assisted by the existence of these rules.
As discussed above we needed to ensure that an Ethan agent:
• detectswhen a plan is not succeeding—e.g., it has been executed
but not achieved its goal;
• accesses a planning system in order to get new plans annotated
with ethical principles; and
• selects the most ethical plan from a set of available plans.
For our prototype we made the simplifying assumption that the
agent could only ever be in one context at a time and that,
therefore, we could reason with the substantive, rather than the
abstract ethical principles. Among other things, this allowed us
to avoid reasoning about ethical consequences within the agent.
Instead of inspecting a plan, p, for the actions, do(a), it contained
(explicitly or implicitly) we were able to list the unacceptable
outcomes and send these to the external planner which could
evaluate the side effects of its plans for these outcomes. It is
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Code fragment 4.1 Verification Belief Rules
1other_choices_violated (T) :− ∼ untr ied_plan_not_violates (T ) ;
2untr ied_plan_not_violates (T ) :− untried_plan (P ) , ∼ an_ethic_in (P , T ) ;
3untried_plan (P) :− applicable (P ) [ applicable_plans ] , ∼ already_tr ied (P ) ;
4an_ethic_in (P , [ Eth | T ] ) :− ethics_of (P , Eth ) [ ethics ] ;
5an_ethic_in (P , [ Eth | T ] ) :− an_ethic_in (P , T ) ;important to observe that even with additional contexts, the
verification of ethical reasoning would unfold in the same manner
as in our one-context-at-a-time prototype, because the choices the
agent makes are still determined only by a unique ethical order
over available plans. However, when multiple context influences
are in play, verification can be used more ‘‘deeply’’ and explore
when and why a particular policy or rule was introduced.
We extended the Gwendolen language as follows:
• We introduced a new data structure, E, into Gwendolen agent
programs consisting of a set of ethical rules. Each rule was
associated with its rank and a guard that specifies the context.
• We tracked the application of plans. Even if a plan was
applicable it was excluded from the list of plans available for
selection if it had already been used once while attempting to
achieve the current goal.
• If no (more) plans were available for a goal we requested plans
from an external planner which annotated the plans with any
ethical rules that risked being violated by the proposed course
of action.
• In selecting plans, we prioritised those that are most ethical
(according to the order <).
In normal operation Gwendolen agents cycle through the
deeds in their intentions. When a deed requires the generation of
a new plan all applicable plans are extracted from the plan library,
one is selected and converted into an intention, then the system
returns to cycling though the deeds in the intentions interleaved
with checking perception and messages for new beliefs etc. For
Ethanwe added the recording of selected plans. This was done by
storing an identifier for the plan together with the unifier that was
used to match it to the current agent state; this information was
linked to the particular goal the plan was expected to achieve. We
extended the plan selection mechanism to select the most ethical
plan from those applicable according to <.
The most significant change for Ethan was altering the
reasoning cycle so that, if no existing plan were applicable, an
external planner would be queried for new plans. This query
involved sending the planner the current goal, and the list of ethical
rules relevant to the current situation in order that the planner
might note any ethical rules that could be violated by a plan’s
execution.
We did not implement a generic planning mechanism for
our investigation but relied upon hard-coded pseudo-planners
customised to the scenarios studied. The Ethan reasoning cycle is
shown in Fig. 2.
4.2. Implementation of verification of ethical decision-making
One of the reasons for selecting Gwendolen as the basis
for our implementation language, Ethan, was that it provided
the potential for formally verifying ethical decision-making.
Gwendolen is implemented in the AJPF framework for model
checking agent programming languages [30]. AJPF comes with
a property specification language based on linear temporal logic
extended with modalities for describing the beliefs of an agent.
This property specification language did not explicitly reference
V and NP from (5). In order to circumvent this we made furtheradaptations to Gwendolen in order to reason about ethics in
Ethan. We enhanced Ethan with a special set of beliefs which
would allow us to reason about these particular beliefs in lieu of
reasoning directly about V andNP .
We enhanced Ethan to store, as explicit beliefs, currently
applicable plans, plans that had been attempted on a particular
goal, and the ethical concerns violated by any selected plan.
These were stored in specialised belief bases. These beliefs are
shown in Table 1. Immediately a check that an Ethan agent
believes concern(E) in AJPF’s property specification language,
B concern(E), corresponds to a check that VE.
In the above, Prolog conventions are used, and so capitalised
names inside terms indicate free variables which are instantiated
by unification (typically against the agent’s beliefs). Ethan
programs may also perform deductive reasoning on their atomic
beliefs as described in their Prolog-style reasoning rules, e.g:
all_well :−∼ brakesCompleteFailure
indicates that the program deduces that all is well if it is not
the case (i.e., ‘‘∼’’) that the brakes have failed (the closed world
assumption is used to deduce this negation). In some cases an atom
in such a Prolog rule needs to specify that deduction should be
applied to a specialised belief base rather than the default one. In
these cases the notation, predicate [belief base], is used.
This allowed us to use Prolog style rules to deduce further
beliefs allowing us to construct NP ; these are shown in Code
Fragment 4.1.
The predicate ‘‘other_choices_violated(L)’’ is deduced
if all untried applicable plans violate a concern contained in the
list L. The currently selected plan is marked as already tried and
so this corresponds to NP L—i.e., that there is no applicable but
unselected plan that does not violate some principle in the set
L. The beliefs about plan applicability (applicable(P)), plans
already tried (already_tried(P)) and the ethical concerns of
particular plans (ethics_of(P, Eth)) were all inserted into
the agent’s belief base during execution of the Ethan reasoning
cycle. It should be noted that while the restriction to untried plans
prevents ‘‘thrashing’’ where the system alternates rapidly between
two possible plans, it does preclude the system from changing its
behaviour should the ethical evaluation of the situation change—
e.g., should a previously occupied field become vacant. We discuss
this in further work.
With these adaptations and the rules in Fragment 4.1 we were
able to formally verify properties of the form
B concern(φ)→ B other_choices_violate(φ1, . . . , φn)
where φ1, . . . , φn are the set of ethical rules inW (φ).
This work on model checking ethical choices is preliminary.
It is undesirable to have constructs, such as beliefs and belief
rules, which can potentially affect program execution, used for
verification purposes alone. However adapting AJPF with a more
expressive property specification language was outside the scope
of this research. The issue of how the approach scales remains
open. The work here does demonstrate that an ethical policy can
be incorporated within a BDI agent in such a way that adherence
to the policy can be formally verified and so we can be certain the
agent will always make the most ethical choices.
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Additional atomic beliefs introduced for verification.
Belief Meaning
Applicable(P) Plan P is applicable
Already_tried(P) Plan P has already been tried when attempting the current
goal
Ethics_of(P, E) Plan P violates ethical rule E
Concern(E) The current selected plan violates E
5. Scenarios
We examined three ethical aviation scenarios for unmanned
aircraft derived from discussions with domain experts: a retired
Royal Air Force fast-jet navigator and a current UK private pilot
licence holder.
We created an Ethan program for each scenario and then
verified that program. It should be noted that model checking is,
inherently, a technique based on an idea of exhaustive testing and,
in the case where a system interacts with the real world, it is
necessary to supply a computational abstraction of the world as a
model. In many cases it is also necessary to provide a model of the
program to be verified, rather than the program itself but in the
case of AJPF this is not necessary though we do have to provide a
model of the planner. In each of our scenarios we have constructed
our models of the planner and the real world in a slightly different
way in order to demonstrate the different ways verification may
be used to establish facts about the system.
In each of our scenarios we first tested our agent in one specific
situation and then verified it in a more general model.
5.1. Ethical principles for civilian UAs
We assume that the UA agent operates only in civilian contexts.
We establish a (small) list of relevant formal ethical concerns as
examples in order to show the method in action. The list contains:
do not harm people (f1), do not harm animals (f2), do not damage self
(f3), and do not damage property (f4). The (formal) ethical policy is
given by comparing the concerns in terms of how unethical it is to
violate them. We propose the order f4 m f3 m f2 m f1, with fi m fj
meaning that it is more ethical to violate fi than fj. Our substantive
ethical policies were context-dependent refinements of the formal
ethical policy.
In our prototype, each flight phase (e.g., landing, taxiing, take-
off) of a UA constitutes one context c. Since all contexts are
known, and the UA can only be in one context at a time, the
substantive concerns can be represented directly, omitting the
formal-substantive relations.5.2. Brake failure during line up
In this scenario we examine a program for a UA to line up on a
runway prior to take-off which includes plans for reacting to brake
failure. We tested this in a simple simulation: Ahead of the aircraft
is a second manned aircraft crossing the runway on a taxiway. To
the left and right of the runway are runway lights (which can be
damaged by aircraft taxiing over them). To the right of the runway
is an airport staff member who has erroneously moved onto the
manoeuvring area of the aerodrome.
The ethical concerns for this example, with the rank of each
concern marked in parentheses, are:
φ1 = do not damage own aircraft (1),
φ2 = do not collide with airport hardware (2),
φ3 = do not collide with people (3),
φ4 = do not collide with manned aircraft (4).
When the agent determines that its brakes have failed it requests
new routes from the ethical planner since its current route to line-
up is no longer valid. The ethical planner quickly produces three
potential routes:
1. Turn left off the runway: this will risk damaging the unmanned
aircraft (φ1) and colliding with airport hardware (the runway
lights, φ2).
2. Turn right off the runway: this will risk damaging the
unmanned aircraft (φ1) and a collision with people (φ3).
3. Continue straight on: this will risk a collision with a manned
aircraft(φ4).
Code Fragment 5.1 shows abridged Ethan code for this example.
Weusemany syntactic conventions fromBDI agent languages:+!g
indicates the addition of a goal, g; +b indicates the addition of a
belief, b; and -b indicates the removal of a belief. Plans consist of
three parts, with the pattern
trigger : guard ← body.
The ‘‘trigger’’ is typically the addition of a goal or a belief
(beliefs may be acquired thanks to the operation of perception
and as a result of internal deliberation); the ‘‘guard’’ states
conditions about the agent (in this example its beliefs) whichmust
be true before the plan can become active; and the ‘‘body’’ is
a stack of ‘‘deeds’’ the agent performs in order to execute the
plan. These deeds typically involve the addition and deletion of
goals and beliefs as well as actions (e.g., plan(regularRoutes,
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18+!startup : {⊤} ← +!missionComplete;
19+!missionComplete : {B flightPhase(lineup),∼B polled(veh) }← +polled(veh), poll(veh);
20+!missionComplete : {B polled(veh), B all_well,∼B route(R)}← plan(regularRoutes,all_well);
21+!missionComplete : {B polled(veh), B all_well, B route(R)}← enactRoute(R);
Code fragment 5.2 Plans for Example 1
1+!missionComplete : {B brakesCompleteFailure}← enactRoute(turn_left); [φ1, φ2]
2+!missionComplete : {B brakesCompleteFailure}← enactRoute(turn_right); [φ1, φ3]
3+!missionComplete : {B brakesCompleteFailure}← enactRoute(continue); [φ4]
Code fragment 5.3
1+!missionComplete : {B brakesCompleteFailure}
2← enactRoutewEffects(doNotDamageOwnAircraf, doNotCollideMannedAircraft); [φ1, φ4]all_well)) which indicate code that is delegated to non-rational
parts of the systems (in this case, the route planning system).
In Fragment 5.1, during normal operation, the agent polls the
vehicle’s sensors and, if all is well, it requests that the planner sup-
plies routes for a normal take-off. The planner does this by sending
predicates naming the routes to the agent which detects them via
perception. Once the agent has a route (line 20) it then delegates
the actual following of the route to the underlying control sys-
tem (enactRoute(R)). If the brakes fail after the vehicle’s sensors
are polled, all these plans become unavailable (since all_well
ceases to be true). In this case the ‘‘external planner’’ returns a set
of routes as plans shown in Code Fragment 5.2.Weuse the notation
[φi1 , φi2 , . . . , φin ] to indicate the substantive ethical concerns that
are violated by each plan. On receiving these plans, and assessing
the ethical policy, the agent elects to turn left.
5.2.1. Formal verification of brake failure on line-up example
Following on from ideas in [21,24] we replaced the ethical
planner we used in the case study with a model that contained
a random component. This model assumed that plans could
potentially be available that violated any combination of the
ethical concerns in the policy. An example of such a plan is given
in Code fragment 5.3.
This ‘‘random’’ planner then selected a random subset of these
plans and returned them to the agent. This meant we were no
longer ‘‘testing’’ the agent in the simple simulation where we
assumed the existence of aircraft and airport infrastructure in
specific places in relation to the agent, but instead in a randomenvironment where aircraft or infrastructure could potentially
appear on any of the alternative routes.
When executed in combination with a model-checking algo-
rithm the random choice caused the search space to branch and
so the model-checking examined every possible set of plans that
might be returned by the ethical planner. This allowed us to show
that the most ethical plan was always chosen no matter what set
of plans were available.
In particular we formally verified the following properties,
where the φi formulae refer to the substantive ethical concerns
used in the example. (Here ‘’ means ‘‘always in the future’’ and
‘B’ means ‘‘agent believes’’.)
(B concern(φ1)→ B other_choices_violate([φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4]))
(B concern(φ2)→ B other_choices_violate([φ2, φ3, φ4]))
(B concern(φ3)→ B other_choices_violate([φ3, φ4]))
(B concern(φ4)→ B other_choices_violate([φ4])).
Collectively these properties show that if the plan chosen violates
some substantive ethical concern, φ, then the other available plan
choices all violated some concern thatwas equal to, ormore severe
than, φ. Further similar properties can be used to establish that the
‘‘most ethical’’ option is always chosen.
In effect this verification demonstrates that, on this example at
least, the underlying implementation of ethical choice was correct.
It took our system over 21 h to verify each of 65,534 combinations
of the 15 possible plans giving a total verification time of nearly
four days for the four properties.
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Code fragment 5.4 Plans for Example 2
1+!avoid_collision : {B flightPhase(eAvoid)}← enactRoute(turn_left); [φ1]
2+!avoid_collision : {B flightPhase(eAvoid)}← enactRoute(emergency_land); [φ2,φ3,φ4]
3+!avoid_collision : {B flightPhase(eAvoid)}← enactRoute(return_to_base); [φ4]











11+!avoid_collision : {B flightPhase(eAvoid),∼B route(eAvoid, Route)}←
12plan(reqEmergRoute,turnRight), ∗route(eAvoid, R), enactRoute(R), wait;
13
14+das(intruder, headOn) : {B flightPhase(cruise)}←
15−flightPhase(cruise), +flightPhase(eAvoid), +! avoid_collision;
16
17−das(intruder, headOn) : {B flightPhase(eAvoid)}←−flightPhase(eAvoid), +flightPhase(cruise);5.3. Erratic intruder aircraft
This example is based on a program for avoiding other aircraft
in accordance with the Rules of the Air. This program takes
into account the possibility that some other aircraft, possibly a
malicious intruder, but potentially also some ill-trained new pilot,
appears on a collision course with the UA and fails to take the
anticipated evasive actions.
In the environment we used for testing, the UA is cruising
through civil airspace when it encounters an intruder aircraft
approaching head on. Here the ROA (Rules of the Air) say that the
UA should turn right, so the agent requests a route for turning
right. However, this plan fails and the detect/avoid sensor (DAS)
continues to indicate that the intruder aircraft is approaching. At
this point the agent knows that it has already tried to turn to
the right in order to avoid the intruder. Since the intruder is still
approaching its first plan has failed. The agent has no more routes
(or Ethan plans) that apply since its only plans obey the ROA and
would cause the agent to turn right again. At this point the ethical
planner is invoked. The relevant substantive ethical concerns and
their ranks are as follows:
φ1 = do not violate turn right rule (2);
φ2 = do not stay above 500 feet rule (2);
φ3 = do not collide with objects on the ground (3);
φ4 = do not collide with aircraft (4).
The planner returns the plans shown in Code Fragment 5.4. The
agent initially chooses to turn left. In our test environment the
oncoming aircraft once again matches the course change and so
the agent then chooses to return to base.
An abridged version of the code for this example is shown in
Code Fragment 5.5. Here,*route(eAvoid, turnRight) causes
the intention to suspend execution until the agent believes it has a
route for turning right. The action wait suspends the intention for
a set time to allow the effects of actions to manifest.
Lines 14–15 are triggered when information arrives from the
DAS that there is an intruder. As a result the flight phase changes
from cruise to eAvoid and a new goal is set up to avoid acollision. The existing, ROA-compliant, plan for this goal is to get a
route for turning right, enact that route and wait a short period to
see if a collisionwill now be avoided. If the plan succeeds the belief
that there is an intruderwill vanish, the flight phase canbe changed
back to cruise, and the goal will be achieved since the agent now
believes a collision has been avoided (see the belief rule in line 8).
When the existing plan fails, the plans in Fragment 5.4 are
added to the agent’s plan library. The first of these (turn_left)
is attempted first. This also fails and the agent then attempts the
third plan (return_to_base), which succeeds.
5.3.1. Formal verification of the erratic intruder example
For this example we chose to leave the planner unchanged,
so the ethical outcomes of turning left, emergency landing and
returning to base remain fixed, but instead had random behaviour
from the oncoming Erratic Intruder. Essentially we are examining
the success and/or failure of all the possible plans in the scenario.
So rather than verifying every possible ethical annotation on a plan,
we verified that the system continued to reason ethically as the
external situation changed. Obviously it would have been possible
to combine random behaviour on the part of the intruder, with
random annotations on the available plans to increase the scope
of the verification result.
As in the previous example, we verified the following proper-
ties,where theφi formulae refer to the substantive ethical concerns
used in Example 2. (Here ‘’ means ‘‘always in the future’’ and ‘B’
means ‘‘agent believes’’.)
(B concern(φ1)→ B other_choices_violate([φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4]))
(B concern(φ2)→ B other_choices_violate([φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4]))
(B concern(φ3)→ B other_choices_violate([φ3, φ4]))
(B concern(φ4)→ B other_choices_violate([φ4])).
Collectively these properties show that if the plan chosen violates
some substantive ethical concern, φ, then the other available plan
choices all violated some concern thatwas equal to, ormore severe
than, φ.
The verification of each property took between 21 and 25 s and
explored 54 model states on 3.06 GHz iMac with 4 GB of memory.
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Our final program was one for handling ‘‘fuel low’’ alerts from
the Fuel subsystem causing the UA to attempt to land. In our test
environment, if the agent cannot locate a safe landing site the
ethical planner is invoked and returns three options (shown with
ethical concerns violated and their ranks):
1. Land in field with overhead power lines. Violates: do not cause
damage to critical infrastructure (4); do not collide with objects
on ground (3); 500 feet low-flying ROA (2); do not damage own
aircraft (1).
2. Land in field with people. Violates: do not collide with people
(5); 500 feet low-flying ROA (2).
3. Land on an empty public road. Violates: do not cause damage to
critical infrastructure (4); 500 feet low-flying ROA (2).
The agent then chooses themost ethical – the third plan – although
both the first and third plans violate an ethical concern of severity
4, the first plan also violates a concern of severity 3 while the third
plan does not.
5.4.1. Formal verification of the fuel low example
For the verification of this example we chose not to examine
all possible plans that could be returned, based on their ethical
outcomes, but instead defined four possible plans (the three listed
above and landing in an empty field which had no adverse ethical
outcomes) and returned some non-empty subset of these plans at
random. Effectively, in this case, the assumption in our model is
that there are only ever four possible options: empty fields, fields
with power lines, fields with people and public roads (and that
the ethical concerns involved with each choice are fixed). What
may vary is which of these four options are available at any given
time. Depending on which plans were available we also allowed
the agent to perceive the presence of the empty field, road, etc. The
model-checking then explored all possible combinations of these
plans that could be returned and we verified that the UA would
always chose the most ethical of the possible landing sites. In this
case, instead of verifying that the most ethical choice was always
made at an abstract level we verified based on the specifics of the
options, i.e., we examined three properties:
P land_on_road →∼ B empty_field
P land_in_field_w_power_lines →∼ B empty_field
∧ ∼ B road
P land_in_field_w_people →∼ B empty_field
∧ ∼ B road∧ ∼ B power_lines
wherePφ indicates that φ holds true in the environment (i.e., it is
potentially perceptible).
The verification of each property took between 7 and 10 s and
explored 64 model states on 3.06 GHz iMac with 4 GB of memory.
5.5. Remark on the examples
Our example programs are really only fragments of some larger
program for control of a UA and in each case we have chosen
to verify only a single property, demonstrating different ways
models of the behaviour of the real world and the planning
system can be created in order to allow verification. Obviously a
full formal verification of an ethical UA would want to examine
the full program, verify against several properties and use the
model most appropriate to the full system—i.e., a model based
on the construction of the planner, ethical annotation system,
and a detailed understanding of the operational environment (all
aspects outside the scope of this paper). Our aim has not been to
present a verified ethical UA but to demonstrate how our system
for reasoning about ethical concerns, can be combined with an
existing system in order to verify properties relating to the ethical
operation of an autonomous system.6. Summary and future work
Before an autonomous system is allowed to operate in a shared
environment with people or other autonomous systems, sufficient
assurances have to be provided that it will always behave within
acceptable legal, ethical, and social boundaries. We propose a
method for, and have implemented a working prototype of, an
ethical extension to a rational agent governing an unmanned
aircraft (UA). The agent can be provided with a particular ethical
policy it uses to distinguish among possible plans and to select the
most ethical plan for execution. We are able to prove formally that
the prototype only performs an unethical action if the rest of the
actions available to it are even less ethical.
Obviously there are limitations to what formal verification can
tell us, particularly since many simplifications are involved. In
our case we assume that the plans the agent receives have been
correctly annotated with ethical consequences. Integration with
assertion-based simulation and hardware-based testing can help
in defining the limitations of formal verification and in developing
a truly reliable system. A methodology for an integrated approach
is currently being developed [52] and we would be interested in
developing a fuller set of examples for our systemand investigating
them in such a framework.
The ethically enhanced agent is autonomous in the choice of
actions, but not in the choice of ethical concerns and policies it will
follow. These are constructed externally, but nonetheless agent-
specific and can be private to the agent. The implemented agent
follows only one ethical policy at any decision-making moment,
becausewe assumed it can be in only one context at a time.We also
assumed that all the contexts are known to the system designer.
Our theoretical framework however is more general and does not
involve these assumption.
The ethical governor of Arkin et al. [13], and similar solutions
to ensure ethical behaviour [15] ‘‘transforms’’ ethical machine
behaviour into a constraint satisfaction problem, namely find
a plan that is ethical. A list of precise ethical constraints is
compiled, purified of ambiguities and inconsistencies, stopping the
autonomous system from performing any activity that violates
these constraints. This approach is simple, elegant, but foremost
does away with all the complications of ethical reasoning. We
consider situations in which no ethical course of action is possible,
which is an issue not addressed in [13,15]. Unfortunately, the
moment we consider that an unethical action has to occur, the
necessity for some form of ethical reasoning creeps in. We focus
on establishing a minimal system for ethical decision-making that
‘‘transform’’ ethical machine behaviour into a weak constraint
satisfaction problem.
The main contribution of our paper is a verifiable ethical
decision-making framework that implements a specified ethical
decision policy. In our approach we do not develop our own
planner or method for generating plans. Rather we assume
annotated plans are supplied to the agent. For BDI agents that have
access to such aplannerwe construct amethod for selecting among
unethical plans, when no ethical plan is available. Our method is
verifiable, namely we can prove that if an agent chooses to execute
a plan that is in any way unethical, it does so only when it believes
that this is theminimally unethical course of action it has available.
This way the ethical decision-making is done by the agent and
one is able to use agent verification techniques to prove correct
behaviour.
An alternative approach for engineering ethical behaviour of
an agent is to develop a planner that only develops a plan that is
ethical, i.e., ‘‘push’’ the ethical decision-making on the side of the
planner. There are two immediate problems with this approach
that we avoid in ours. First, the possible ethical consequences of
a plan cannot be known until the plan is developed. Although the
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not. Second, a planner is a tool that can be used by several agents.
When the ethical decision-making is on the planner side, all the
agents that use the same planner would be subject to the same
ethical policy which may or may not be known to the agent. This
infringes on the autonomy of the agent to a certain extent.
The ethically enhanced agent we described follows only one
ethical policy at any decision-making moment, the agent can
only be in one context at a time and all the contexts are known
(the contexts being the flight phases of the UA). The advantage
yielded by this approach is in removing the need for additional
calculation within the agent to relate specific plan outcomes to
ethical principles via ethical rules. However, it cannot always
be the case that the contexts in which an autonomous system
operates are predicted or non-overlapping. We would like to
extend our implementation to consider the full framework of
ethical reasoning as outlined in Section 3.2.
Our implemented agent is also limited to only attempting a
plan once for any given goal. In a highly dynamic environment,
where the predicted ethical outcomes of plans might be rapidly
changing, this is clearly unsatisfactory and wewould be interested
in extending the system so that plans could be re-evaluated if their
ethical outcomes had changed, while making sure that the system
must, at some point, commit to some plan.
Our general theory assumes that ethical rules can be expressed
in terms of do(a)⇒c ¬Eϕ where a is an action involved in some
plan p. However in our examples we already see that the relevant
actions (e.g., ‘‘collide with airport hardware’’) may not be explicitly
referenced by a plan (e.g., ‘‘turn right’’). More work is therefore
needed to understand the nature of actions that are implicit or
side effects of some plan in order to better enable the calculation
of ethical consequences either within agents or planning systems.
We would also like to extend our system so that it could account
for uncertainty in the evaluation of ethical outcomes.
There are two ways in which a context can influence the
ethical constraining of an agent: (a) by making abstract principles
substantive; and (b) by indicating which ethical policy should be
used. So far, we use one ethical policy and contexts influence
ethical reasoning by specifying what counts as an ethical violation
in them. However, it is not difficult to envision situations in
which the agent would need to use a different policy. Consider
for example, the principles of doing no harm and autonomy (in
medicine). During a minor surgery, the patient might prefer a
local anaesthetic over a total one, however if the surgery turns
out to be more complicated than predicted, the patient’s wishes
for local anaesthetic will be disregarded, violating the autonomy
principle, in the interest of not harming him/her, preserving the
no-harm principle. However, a patient might express the desire
to not be resuscitated if his/her heart stops. Under these special
circumstances (heart failure), observing the principle of autonomy
should be placed as more ethical in the policy than the principle of
doing no harm.
There are many ways in which a policy can be updated with
respect to a special context; we mention two. The most simple
way would be to provide a replacement policy. This method
is only possible if the context is predetermined, and it also
represents significant effort, since all principles have to be re-
ordered. Another method is to only alter a part of the policy
concerning specific principles. For this method, update procedures
need to be developed.
One way to develop policy update procedures is to consider
them as a special case of belief update and use a belief update
operators, see for example [53] for such operators. Clearly,whether
the requirements for belief update operators are fully suited for
operators used to update ethical policies is an issue that merits
further exploration. A further hindrance to using belief updateto update ethical policies could arise from research in belief
update being normative, studyingwhich properties a belief update
operator should satisfy, rather than operational, i.e., designing
belief update operators.
Finally, while our examples have been from the UA domain the
approach and principles are general enough to be relevant across
autonomous systems. Consequently, we aim to extend thiswork to
the formal verification of domestic/healthcare robotics and driver-
less cars in the future.
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